This paper integrates the contributions to a forthcoming volume of the same title by the authors. The volume analyzes and empirically examines linkages between the real and financial variables that themselves link open economies--"linkage" thus has a double meaning. Two types of linkages are discussed. Structural linkages describe differences across economies and among sectors in market structure (competitive/oljgopoljstjc), productivity growth, and openness to trade. Inter-temporal linkages describe differences across economies and over time or circumstance in saving preferences and capital formation, government budgets, portfolio shares of "inside" and "outside" assets, and openness to mobile financial flows. Structural linkages are important chiefly for explaining sustained divergences in national competitiveness as measured by purchasing-power-parity norms. Inter-temporal linkages also account for them, as well as for sustained divergences in current and capital-account positions, geographical growth rates, and national incomes of residents.
2 linkages among open economies spring from two fundamental sources: structural (or inter-sectoral) differences among economies and temporal (or intertemporal) differences among them. Some of the more important structural differences are described in sections E and F, which integrate contributions from chapters by Krugman (1986) , Marston (1986) , and Kravis and Lipsey (1986) .
Temporal differences, which can also be conceived as circumstantial differences in a world of uncertainty, are discussed in section C, which integrates contributions from chapters by Hutchison and Pigott (1986) , Hamada and Horiuchi (1986) , and De Grauwe and de Belief roid (1986) . Structural and temporal differences are examined together in Section H.
B. How the Typical Twain Do Not Meet
The separation described above can also be called a dichotomy of interest.
Real-side international economics is concerned with the way cross-border transactions affect an economy's trade patterns, production structure, and factor markets. Financial-side international economics is concerned with the way cross-border transactions affect an economy's exchange rates, interest rates, and financial markets. Typical treatments of these concerns are almost completely independent of each other.
The typical pure analytic approaches to "real" international trade make exchange rates, interest rates, and capital movements irrelevant. Such financial variables are ignored or taken for granted in the most familiar general-equilibrium models. Exchange rates are ignored because they are assumed to be the relative price of two moneys, both of which are "veils" that have no real effects. Money does not matter, and neither do exchange rates. They are all neutral. Interest rates do not matter because they are essentially intertemporal prices, with only second-order-of-small effects on inter-sectoral prices and relative factor prices. Financial capital movements may matter in a "long run" long enough for them to influence an economy's endowment of productive capital. But its endowment (stock) is often taken to be so large relative to its annual, even decennial, increments that changes in the increments can be ignored as infinitesimal. International trade in productive capital (or labor) may also be ignored if commodity trade eliminates the wage-rental incentives for factors to become mobile across borders (Mundell (1957) ). And since international transfers of financial purchasing power must be reversed sometime if national budget balance is to be maintained, familiar general-equilibrium models insist that long-run equilibria feature no capital-account (or current-account) imbalance. 4 The typical pure analytic approaches to international finance make the sectoral structure of production and comparative advantage irrelevant. Sectoral structure is ignored in familiar macroeconomic approaches because demands for (and supplies of) financial assets are assumed to depend on aggregate real income and wealth, not on their sectoral source, and on inter-temporal prices reflected in earnings and interest rates, not on inter-sectoral prices. Asset stocks in turn determine capital movements, exchange rates, and, in pegged exchange-rate regimes, official intervention. Devaluation and revaluation in such regimes may have temporary differential impacts on sectoral outputs, prices, and employment. But sectoral structure is usually irrelevant for calculating the long-run effects of these parity changes. Even non-tradeables prices move to match the equilibrium shift in tradeables prices from the parity change, given price flexibility and inter-sectoral factor mobility.
C. Difference in Focus on Different Relative Prices
All international economics is concerned with "foreign relative prices relative to domestic relative prices" -a double relative in every sense, and a mouthful, too. But the relative prices being compared across borders differ between international trade and international finance. The dichotomy of interest between the sub-areas can be clarified by describing the different relative prices that occupy each, and by discussing when one set of relative prices can be assumed independent of another. The description will also be useful in summarizing several of the chapters that follow in this volume.
We can conceive P and * to be indexes of prices denominated in the currencies of a domestic and foreign economy, respectively. Each index is a function of two vectors, one of tradeables prices and other of nontradeables prices (p,,) . Each vector contains many elements, each representing the price of a given sector's homogeneous product. -I -for all i j tj tj 6 determine each economy's comparative advantage, production structure, exports, imports, and implicit factor demands. Although p's are expressed in domestic currency and p*'s in foreign currency, exchange rates do not directly influence the relative price comparisons above, and are ignored in "real" analysis. Also ignored are expected and actual inflation and interest rates, which have to do with the rate of change of prices between periods 0 and 1. It is not these rates of change that concern typical "real" analysis. Its concern is the international comparison of the relative prices for period 0, and then the same comparison independently for period 1. Comparative advantage may indeed change between the periods --but if so, the reason will have been tial rates of change among sectoral prices, not their common rate of change (i.e., not general inflation).
Typical pure analytic approaches to international finance are concerned with relative inter-temporal prices, for example P1/P0 relative to P/P, using subscripts 0 and 1 to denote time. The ratios of the ratios P1 P -I , for all lengths of interval between 0 and 1, O 0 influence the economies' relative interest rates, and in turn the exchange rate and capital movements between them. Ratios formed from the sectoral prices that are components of each price index, such as above, have no particular implication for the value of P or P*, and are ignored in international finance. Also ignored are international differences in the sectoral composition of production, themselves the consequences of relative intersectoral prices. Financial assets that are issued by various sectors of the economy, as well as those issued by the government, are typically assumed to lose much of their sectoral identity as integrated capital markets "size up" 7 their market value. The mechanism by which they are homogenized is competitive financial arbitrage, motivated by the desire of lenders to maximize their future returns, and of borrowers to minimize their future debt burdens.
When asset markets are well integrated within each economy in this way, the sectoral composition of production and balance sheets is irrelevant to the concerns of international finance. 8 0. "Laws of One Price" and Purchasing-Power-Parity All this notwithstanding, the dichotomization of international trade and finance has never been absolute. Some real-financial linkages have always been implicit, and a few have received significant attention, especially those relating to the "law of one pricet' and "purchasing power parity." These venerable linkages play important roles in several of the chapters in this volume, and need elaboration.
The first step in the elaboration is to describe equilibrium price structures in open economies. One of the chief conclusions of "real" analysis is that unencumbered, perfectly competitive trade in goods and services will make the relative price of tradeable I to tradeable j the same in every trading economy. In special circumstances, furthermore, the relative prices of some nontradeables k and 1 may be equated across economies --not, obviously, because they are traded, but because their producers employ the same primary factors as do tradeables producers, and must pay competitive rates for those factors.1
Relative factor prices themselves may become equated across economies, as perhaps the most important example of how global tradeables markets may implicitly "globalize" even non-tradeables markets.
Typical "real" analysis has implications for price levels as well as relative prices. The same unencumbered, perfectly competitive forces of trade will bring about price-level equalization for any tradeable good:
where the exchange rate e is the domestic currency price of foreign currency.
This equation is called the "law of one price," and would come close to holding 9 for indexes of tradeables prices: eP (where P, P represent indexes of tradeable goods alone). The "law of one price" might hold even for some non-tradeable goods too, for the reasons described above. That -is why economists presume that general price indexes ought to vary similarly across economies:
should vary quite closely with eP.
P should vary somewhat closely with eP*.
These co-variations are called "purchasing-power-parity" (PPP) relationships.
The accuracy of each is enhanced by the accuracy of the component laws of one price, and by similiarity between the domestic and foreign weights implicit -in the price-index functions f and f* The accuracy of the second (general) PPP relationship will be further enhanced by any tendency of non-tradeables prices to track tradeables prices due to internal competition over primary factors.
Laws of one price describe prices of homogeneous goods taken one by one.
PPP relationships describe aggregations of those prices. Although laws of one price generally contribute to the accuracy of PPP relationships, they are neither sufficient nor necessary. One could see perfect validity of laws of one price and failure of PPP because of international differences in the weights that sensible aggregation suggests. One could imagine conversely that PPP relationships were reasonably accurate, but that laws of one price did not describe cross-boundary prices well for certain sub-sets of sectors.
PPP relationships are used often to specify a norm for exchange rates: e "should" vary closely with or even P/P*. Such use illustrates one of the simplest, oldest, and most important types of real-financial linkage: the relative price of two nations' money, a financial asset, should bear some pre-10 dictable relationship to relative aggregates of their prices for current goods and services.
Of course, trade barriers, international transport costs, and other encumbrances interfere with "laws" of one price, and with PPP as a consequence.
Yet such barriers are often roughly proportional to prices (as, for example, an ad valorem tariff). In that case, these price relationships will be observable in rates of change over time, albeit not in levels. These are usually called Exchange rates in these cases do influence relative prices, international competitiveness, and by implication, comparative advantage, too. Imperfectly competitive market structure is a mechanism for real-financial linkage. Marston (1986) Like Marston, Kravis and Lipsey (1986) illustrate an international linkage from real economic structure to a "financial" variable. They ask how an economy's international competitiveness is affected by its: (1) per capita income, (2) sectoral structure (between t and n goods), and (3) where P, P denote indexes of non-tradeables prices, and Z (j=1,2,3) stands for their three structural determinants of measured competitiveness. They use the United States as a standard against which to compare other countries, normalizing U.S. prices (P*) to be 1.00, and then calling the 25 calculated P/e's each nation's "price level" (implicitly relative to the United States).
If purchasing-power-parity held, every nation's price level would clearly be 1.00, too. Kravis and Lipsey show instead that divergences from 1.00 are very large, very persistent over time, and reasonably well explained (across economies) by international structural differences.
Furthermore, as detailed below, chapters by Hutchison-Pigott (1986) and Hamada-Horjuchi (1986) Differences across economies in inter-sectoral trends are one of the fundamental sources of real-financial linkage. They are emphasized in both the Marston (1986) chapter and that by Kravis and Lipsey (1986) , and have a modest analytical and empirical history (Balassa (1964) , others). Among the most important implications of this work is that exchange rates, although a "financial" variable are influenced significantly by relative product prices.
These linkages can be detailed usefully in Figure This sort of real-financial linkage can be illustrated first across economies, in the fashion of Kravis and Lipsey, and then over time, in the fashion of Marston. Suppose that two economies differ in their real structure in the following way. One has an across-the-board technological advantage that by world standards is especially large in tradeable goods. The other has a less marked absolute and differential advantage. Or to make the point more graphic, suppose that the second economy is a laggard across-the-board in productivity, and especially backward in tradeables. The first economy will, of course, tend to have above-average per capita income, and the second, below 17 average. The production possibilities curve of the rich economy can be taken to be Q.Q, and that of the poor economy "Equilibrium" production and consumption for the rich economy in typical analyses can be identified with point P', C', and for the poor economy with point P. C. These are equilibrium points in the sense that each economy's single-period aggregate budget is balanced -aggregate spending during the period is exactly equal to aggregate income during the period. The value of national production (P) is equal to the value of national consumption (C). Each economy's trade must thus be balanced, with commodity exports equal in value to commodity imports.
When we consider inter-temporal trade below, we will abandon this definition of equilibrium as overly rigid and unrealistic. But it is quite typical.
And it leads directly to the conclusion that the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables is lower in the rich economy than the poor one. That is, P P
(2) n n This much is familiar. It is all "real" analysis. Less familiar is its implication for financial variables, such as the national "price levels" that Kravis and Lipsey emphasize. These are defined as P'/e' and Pie, where P' = f'(P,P) and P = f(Pt,P) as in (1). Since these index functions ought sensibly to be homogeneous of degree one in all prices, they can be rewritten as (3) P'/e' = f'(P/e', P/e') and P/e = f(P/e, P/e) Because each of these two economies faces the same exogenous world prices of tradeables, laws of one price suggest that P will be equal to both 18 and P/e. Using these equalities, (3) can be rewritten as (4) (4) P'/e' = f'(P, P,/e') and P/e = f(P, P/e).
and (2) can be rewritten as (5) e' e (5) n n Then substituting (5) into (4), it is clear that the national price level will be higher in the first (rich) economy than in the second (that is, P'/e' > P/e) -as long as the price indexes f' and f are sufficiently similar.
To summarize, the cross-country real-financial linkage illustrated here is that economies with strong productivity advantage by world standards in tradeables relative to non-tradeables will have higher price levels than naive purchasing-power-parity norms suggest. Economies with relatively weak productivity advantage in tradeables relative to non-tradeables will have lower price levels than naive PPP norms suggest. These latter economies are often presumed to be poor and the former rich, a presumption based on productivity in non-tradeables sectors being similar world-wide.
A similar real-financial link over time is illustrated by Marston. His analysis can be summarized in Figure 2 by assuming that tn and QQ, both represent Japanese production-possibilities curves, the first in the 1970s and the second in the 1980s. Their difference illustrates Japanese productivity growth that was especially rapid in tradeables over this period com- Thus what we describe here as inter-temporal linkages could also be conceived as circumstantial linkages, those caused by uncertainty. It is from this perspective that De Grauwe and de Bellefroid (1986) analyze the effect of exchange-rate variability on a very long-run, decade-spanning measure of international-trade volume. They are not surprised to find a significant negative correlation between variability and volume because they recognize the inadequacies (even non-existence) of financial markets for hedging risk over decade-long horizons. They thus illustrate one of Stockman's key conclusions: 22 a spectrum of financial markets is often necessary to support any particular "real" transaction; in the absence of the right financial markets, the real transaction may not take place.
Real-financial linkages from inter-temporal differences across economies can be detailed usefully in Figure 3 . fc represents an economy's productionpossibilities curve between "current" goods and "future" goods, (both assumed homogeneous and tradeable. If the economy is closed to international transactions, then the vertical axis is typically considered also to measure capital goods output --produced increments to the economy's endowment (stock) of productive capital --which are the way a closed economy's claims on future goods can be increased (or maintained, when there is depreciation). For convenience it is assumed that national preferences are homothetic (less defensible than sometimes because of the presence of a pre-existing background stock of claims on the future, implied by the interrupted vertical axis below the origin labelled 100).
Inter-temporal linkages identified by both Hamada-Horiuchi and by
Hutchison-Pigott can be described in this diagram. Hamada-Horiuchi focus on preferences, in particular, on financial liberalization given differences between economies in inter-temporal preferences. Hutchison-Pigott focus on availability of unique financial instruments, in particular, on differences between economies in "production" rates of government securities through fiscal policies that create budget deficits.
(i) Financial Liberalization and Differences in Preferences. Japan's national saving rate is high by world standards, and for purposes of refererice, we might suppose that the Japanese economy is closed not only by capital controls but to trade as well. Then Japan's equilibrium could be described by point PJCJ on the preference contour through that point. Real interest 23 rates, reflected in the slope of the tangent line, would be low. If the rest of the world has a lower saving rate but is otherwise identical to Japan (for convenience, and let us call it the United States) then its equilibrium could be described by point Real interest rates would be higher than in Japan. In this case, the Japanese-owned capital stock would be growing at QC per period, just as it was before financial liberalization. But the Japanese-domiciled share of this increment would be growing at only Q,S; S,C' would represent "net foreign investment" in the U.S. by Japan.
Liberalization of commodity trade alone between the two economies would
The growth rate of the capital stock in geographical Japan would be lower than previously, as would the growth rate of Japanese GNP. In fact, Japanese growth rates would be identical to those of the geographical U.S. in this equilibrium (because 9's' is equal to QP' One of Hutchison's and Pigott's important points is a difference in intertemporal transformation opportunities. Even a perceived shift in Japan's ability to use external trade to transform present goods into claims on future goods establishes a real-financial linkage. To show the motive for such trade in its starkest simplicity, assume that U.S. and Japanese inter-temporal preferences were identical after all, and depicted by the preference contours through point Then because from a Japanese perspective U.S. Treasury securities are outside assets, and because the perceived U.S. productionpossibilities curve has been shifted vertically, Japan will also perceive higher potential real interest rates at than at as reflected in the steeper tangent price line. Japanese residents (unlike U.S. residents) will be prepared to bid for assets at prices between those implied by the two tangents. Trade will be thereby encouraged in which Japan exports consumer goods to the U.S. in return for Treasury securities (as well as assets and capital goods that may be perfect substitutes for the Treasury securities).
The U.S. will incur a trade-account deficit and probably debt-service obligations, offset by a capital-account surplus, plus other consequences discussed by Hutchison and Pigott.
A purist might object to this real-financial linkage by observing that the world production possibilities curve that could be constructed from Figure   3 's true U.S. and Japanese curves would be unaffected by any issue of government securities. That observation is correct, but focuses only on production of real goods. It neglects "production't of financial assets, which is an 29 equally important element of generalized supply in this perspective, and especially important when the asset is "inside" to some agents and "outside" to others. Real-financial linkage follows directly. It arises in an open economy for precisely the same reason that it would arise in a closed economy with "distribution effects" caused by two groups of agents, one that considers government securities to be net wealth, and one that does not.
H. Structural and Inter-Temporal Linkages Jointly Considered
Combining the inter-temporal and structural perspectives on real-financial linkage is valuable for its suggestive richness. It also allows fuller reference to the Hutchison-Pigott (1986) chapter and to familiar macroeconomic linkages that are de-emphasized in this volume.
Every economy in reality has an array of differentiated current goods and assets (claims on future goods). It has proved helpful above to recognize this very simply in the distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable current goods. Now it is helpful to conceive symmetrically of tradeable and non-tradeable assets, identifying the first with government securities and ownership claims to capital goods, and identifying the second with money. It is also helpful to conceive of wealth owners holding a portfolio of tradeable assets and "their own" (but not the other) non-tradeable money, just as current-goods consumers buy tradeables and "their own" non-tradeable (but not the other).
General equilibrium in this conception includes stock equilibrium in all asset markets, characterized in ways that are captured in monetary, portfoliobalance, and stock-adjustment models of international finance. Figure 4 summarizes what is familiar from these models and draws out their implications for real-financial linkages along with Figure 5 .
In Figure 4 , asset-market equilibrium is described in quadrant 1, where schedules HH and FF describe pairs of (nominal) interest rates (r) and exchange rates (e) that make portfolio managers content to hold the existing 31 stock supplies of (non-tradeable) money and (tradeable) foreign securities.
At the interest and exchange rate common to both schedules, the stock supply of domestic securities must be willingly held, too, because existing wealth is constrained to be held in either money, domestic securities, or perfectly substitutable foreign securities. Conditions for equilibrium can be written H/P = L(y, v, r) eF/P = F (y, v, r) where H and F stand for existing nominal stocks of money and foreign securities in an economy's portfolio, and P is an index of prices of current tradeables and non-tradeables as in equations (1).
The real demand for money varies directly with real income (y) and real wealth (v),6 and inversely with the domestic rate of interest on tradeable securities (r). The real demand for foreign securities varies inversely with real income and the domestic rate of interest and directly with real wealth.
The foreign rate of interest can be treated exogenously and ignored if for convenience we focus on a small economy.
The FF curve in Figure 4 is negatively sloped because a rise in e (appreciation of foreign currency) creates an excess supply of foreign securities, requiring a fall in the domestic rate of interest to correct it.7 The HH curve is positively sloped because a rise in e creates an excess demand for domestic money which must be offset by a rise in the domestic rate of interest.
The real sector is typically linked to this financial sector by an equilibrium condition equating supplies of and demands for domestically pro- Private saving is usually assumed to be directly related to income and the interest rate, and private investment inversely to the interest rate. This equilibrium condition yields an "IS curve" depicted in quadrant 2 of Figure 4 , and an aggregate demand curve in quadrant 3. When factor markets are free of distortions (factor-price rigidities, money illusion, etc.) so that the economy operates on its production possibilities curve in Figure 3 , then the aggregate supply curve in Figure 4 can be taken to be vertical.8 The distance Oy in Figure 4 in fact corresponds to distances like OP in Figure 3 . Furthermore the "IS curve" in Figure 4 is precisely the demand curve generated by the preference map of Figure 3 , and distances corresponding to 1, 0, S1 and I can be found in (These supply and demand curves could in fact be derived directly from Figure 2 by rotating a price line respectively around the production possibilities curve and the indifference curve that is tangent to it.)
The initial equilibrium in Figure 5 shows both markets to be cleared at relative price and thus reflects the familiar constraint in pure trade theory that the market for non-tradeables must clear and that trade must be balanced Monetary expansion causes the initial depreciation of domestic currency from e0 to e1 in Figure 4 to raise P. (incipiently) in Figure 5 if the law of one price holds. But a rise in the price ratio creates excess demand in nontradeables as well as a trade surplus. For small economies, it is clear that, in the absence of shifts in demand or supply, the original price ratio is the only equilibrium relative price. Hence the excess demand in the nontradeables sector serves to raise the price of non-tradeables, ensuring that its movement keeps pace with the nominal depreciation. In this situation we will observe the law of one price not only for tradeables but for non-tradeables as well. The rise in n in turn feeds back to the financial sector by raising the price level, shifting HH and FF up. In the new equilibrium, P, E and P will have all risen proportionately, while real variables remain the same.
During the adjustment process, any decline in the rate of interest that increases aggregate expenditure has the effect of shifting out the Dt and D curves, thereby adding to the disequilibrium in the non-tradeables sector, while reducing the trade surplus. That same transitional decline in the interest rate can, however, also cause both the exchange rate and tradeables prices to 'tovershoot" their ultimate equilibrium values (Dornbusch (1976) , purchase non-tradeables. The demand for non-tradeables shifts to D in Figure 5 , creating an excess demand at the initial relative price and requiring a fall in the relative price of tradeables if equilibrium in non-tradeables is to be restored.
The needed decline in the price ratio can be achieved by currency appreciation and/or a nominal price rise in non-tradeables. The fall in the relative price of tradeables is needed to liberate resources for use in non-tradeables production and to crowd out private demand for non-tradeables.
As price falls in tradeables, increased private consumption of tradeables is met by imports. Hence, the budget deficit and the rise in public demand for non-tradeables leads directly to a trade deficit, matched of course by a capital-account surplus that represents the sale abroad of a portion of each 36 period's additional issue of government securities. What happens to internal relative prices, and relative production and consumption of the two types of goods, is in fact completely analogous to the discussion of Kravis-Lipsey's and Marston's work in Section F above. There, however, the impetus comes from supply-side shocks, whereas in Hutchison and Pigott, the impetus is from the demand side.
In the financial sector, the fiscal expansion raises the stock of domestic securities, the effect of which depends to some extent upon whether domestic money and securities are considered part of domestic wealth or whether foreign ("outside") securities are the only financial asset representing wealth.
There exists considerable disagreement on this issue, as implied in Section G, but we will assume that wealth is increased at least somewhat. The rise in wealth shifts the HH and FF curves upward, hence raising the rate of interest.
The IS curve in quadrant 2 of Figure 4 would also shift up in response to the fiscal expansion.
Given fixed aggregate supply (albeit change in its composition) and a fixed money stock, the overall price level P will tend to move directly with velocity, which rises due to the higher interest rate. Although it seems possible that prices of both tradeables and non-tradeables rise due to the fiscal expansion, n must rise more than in order to bring about the required decline in equilibrium t'n And the nominal exchange rate e must fall in this case enough to bring about the real appreciation (higher P/eP) that is required to generate the trade-balance deficit required. (We assume the economy is too small to affect Pt.)
The preceding illustrates a set of linkages between the real and financial sides of the economy due to fiscal policy. It also provides a useful insight into the efficacy of exchange market intervention. 37 Suppose that the authorities were dissatisfied with the required appreciation (lower e) and they attempted through exchange market intervention to reverse it. Suppose further that this was accomplished by official purchases of foreign securities added to reserves which shift the FF curve up in the first panel of Figure 4 , bringing about the nominal rise in e, at least as far as the financial side of the economy is concerned. The depreciation would push up the price ratio in Figure 5 and create excess demand in the nontradeables sector while reducing the trade deficit. This outcome cannot be sustained, however, for the relative price must fall again to restore equilibrium in non-tradeables. The ensuing rise in the price of nontradeables would have secondary effects in the financial sector, pushing the two curves up. The upshot of the intervention policy would be a depreciation of the dollar in nominal terms, but no change in the price ratio, nor in the real exchange rate, and hence no improvement in the trade balance.
Exchange market intervention of the type discussed is a nominal or financial policy, while the trade balance deficit is a real phenomenon.
Intervention fails to budge the trade balance because it has no effect on the domestic relative price.
The discussion above assumes that the fiscal policy increases purchases of non-tradeables. If by contrast, the increased government expenditure were to fall entirely on traded goods, represented by a shift in the Dt curve to D, the initial real side effect is a trade balance deficit at the original relative price
Meanwhile, the financial sector repercussions are as before. The price relative cannot change, however, since that would break equilibrium in the non-tradeables sector. Thus, the nominal exchange rate and the price of non-tradeables must rise (or fall) together, preserving the price 38 relative, while the trade balance moves into deficit by an amount equal to the increase in government spending. The real exchange rate remains unaffected.
The clear lesson is that the real-financial linkages from fiscal policy are ambiguous! They depend not only on the type of differentiated asset that the government uses to finance its budget deficit, but also on the type of differentiated goods that it buys. Nominal and real exchange rates, relative prices, and several other variables ought to respond differently to fiscal policy in different economies, depending on these considerations. Therefore it is no surprise, and is in fact an important contribution, that Hutchison and Pigott find different configurations of quantitative effects for different countries in their sample.
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END NOTES
1.
This prediction depends on a conception of non-tradeables as comparable goods from economy to economy, only perhaps facing prohibitive transport costs, for example, personal services such as hair styling, shoeshines, and dry cleaning. To apply the prediction to unique national non-tradeables, for example, judicial services, would be nonsense because factor requirements will obviously be themselves unique to each economy.
2"Competitive advantage," measured say by %A(Pt./eP.), is obviously a quite different concept than "comparative advantage, measured by
The two concepts are often confused.
3See, for example, for discussion and references, Goldstein (1984) .
.
. .
In interpreting the two production-possibilities curves as belonging to two economies, we are adopting the conception that one economy's non-tradeables are comparable to the other's, and measuring both along the same horizontal axis --see note 1.
5This particular wording is Charles Pigott's.
6Real wealth can be visualized in Figure 3 as the vertical distance between the points C and the horizontal axis market 0.
7rhe presence of at least one asset with a nominally fixed face value, of which money is the best example, is necessary for this conclusion. 
